The Anthrax Panic

The Anthrax Panic
at Michigan State University

These are notes on the transcript of the jury trial in Allison et al v City of East Lansing, WD Mich, File No. 5:03-CV-156. The trial, held in September 2005, involved the emergency response to a false anthrax alarm at Michigan State University in East Lansing, Michigan on 12 October 2001. The emergency responders "decontaminated" fifteen women. The women claimed they were molested, and the jury agreed, delivering a $480,000 verdict against the City of East Lansing. The verdict was affirmed on appeal, and in 2007 the City chose to abandon further appeals.

These notes are not verbatim extracts from the transcript, but selected summaries that focus on the decision to begin -- and the decision not to abort --the emergency response protocol. Now that the litigation is finished, we may be able to reflect impartially on the episode and learn from it.

References are to pages in the transcript. The complete transcript is available at At Public Response | The Anthrax Panic

The Suspicious Letter

The Michigan State University Graduate School is located on the first floor of Linton Hall. In 2001 there was a mail room, about the size of a closet, on the first floor. Deborah C, pp 66-67.

Deborah C had worked at the MSU Graduate School since 1987. She managed the Graduate School's Office of Student Affairs, located in the suite of offices known as "Room 118." Deborah C, p 65.

Deborah C first noticed the letter on 11 October 2001, when a student-employee brought it to her. The letter had a stamped return address in the upper left corner. The return address stamp was smudged and distorted. There was a piece of tape across the flap of the envelope. The letter had a graphic illustration in the upper left -- a stop sign. It said, "Stop animal research" or "Stop animal exploitation." The letter was addressed to the Vice President for Graduate Studies, Room 118, Linton Hall, which was unusual because the Vice President in charge of the Graduate School was not located in Linton Hall but in the Administration Building. Deborah C, pp 67-68, 117.

Deborah C told the student to take the letter back to the mail room. Deborah C did not decide right away what to do with the letter. The next day, 12 October 2001, Deborah C went down to the mail room, retrieved the letter, and opened it. As she opened the letter, she felt a burning sensation in her throat. She closed the letter, put it back in its envelope and put a piece of tape on it. Deborah C, pp 68-69, 117-118.

Deborah C took the letter to Cathie A in the Dean's office in the suite known as "Room 110." Deborah C flashed the letter to Cathie A and told her she had a burning sensation in her throat. Deborah C told Cathie A that she wasn't sure what to do. At the trial, Deborah C testified that she had heard about the anthrax incident in Washington, DC. But she testified that she never thought the letter contained anthrax that had been put there by a terrorist, and she did not feel she needed medical attention. Deborah C, pp 69-70, 118-119.

Cathie A had worked for MSU since about 1989. In 2001 she was an administrative assistant in the graduate school in Room 110. She did web design, publication design, and admissions work. Karen K, Dean of the graduate school, was Cathie A's supervisor. Cathie A, p 166.

Cathie A recalls that Deborah C came into Room 110 on 12 October 2005. She placed an envelope on her desk and said the letter was unusual. Cathie A saw the envelope but did not look at the letter inside. Cathie A, pp 167, 170.

Two students were in the room. Melissa G was a student working at the graduate school. She had been working there since 1999. She worked in various Graduate School office suites, including rooms 110, 116, and 118. She did copying, faxing, answered phones, and handled mail. Amanda M was a student working in Linton Hall as a receptionist; she answered phones and did xeroxing. Both Melissa G and Amanda M were in Room 110 when Deborah C brought the letter in. They stood by and listened as Deborah C told Cathie A that she was worried. Amanda M, pp 124, 148-149. Melissa G, pp 122-124.

Amanda M recalls that she picked up the envelope and looked at the address. Melissa G recalls that she did not touch the letter. Amanda M, p 151. Melissa G, pp 123, 145.

Cathie A suggested that Deborah C call the MSU police. Deborah C was at first reluctant to do that. Then Cathie A suggested that they both talk to Karen K. They both went into Karen K's office, where Karen K told Deborah C to call the MSU police non-emergency number. Deborah C called the police and talked to the dispatcher. Cathie A, pp 167-168. Deborah C, pp 70-71. Melissa G, p 124.

Deborah C called the dispatcher at 1:14 pm. Deborah C, p 76.

Deborah C told the MSU police dispatcher that she just opened up a letter and had a burning sensation in her throat. Deborah C recalls that she did not tell the dispatcher that the letter contained anthrax or powder. Deborah C, p 71.

The MSU police dispatcher told Deborah C that she would have a police officer call Deborah C back and that she would send a police officer over to make a report. Deborah C, p 71.

After Deborah C called the dispatcher, Officer P, an MSU police officer, called Deborah C and said she would come to Linton Hall shortly to take a report. Deborah C, p 72.

Officer P arrived at Linton Hall at 1:27 or 1:28. Deborah C, pp 72, 76.

Officer P, an MSU police officer, has worked for the campus police since 1980. Officer P, p 460.

Deborah C and Officer P talked when Officer P arrived at Linton Hall. Deborah C pointed to the letter. Officer P looked at the letter. Officer P did not pick up the letter. Deborah C told Officer P she had a burning sensation in her throat. Deborah C, p 72.

Melissa G and Cathie A overheard Deborah C tell the campus police officer, Officer P, that there was no white powder or other substance in the letter. Melissa G, pp125-126. Cathie A, p 170.

Officer P recalls that Deborah C pointed out the letter to her and said she had opened the letter and resealed it in another room before bringing it to Room 110. Officer P looked at the envelope. It had an address something like, "University Graduate Studies for Research." Officer P did not open the letter. Officer P then called her superior in the MSU police department, lieutenant Mary Johnson. Johnson told Officer P to hold everyone in the office. Officer P, pp 464-465.

While waiting in Room 110 for the decontamination to begin, Officer P had several conversations with Mary Johnson. One of the women in Room 110 told Officer P that she had talked to the women in Room 116 and that a couple of women in that office suite had sore throats or coughs. During one of her phone conversations with Johnson, before the men in protective gear arrived at Room 110, Officer P passed that information along to Johnson. Officer P, pp 466, 493.

The White Powder Rumor

Deborah C called the MSU police at 1:14. Deborah C, p 76.

Officer P recalls that Heidi Williams, the dispatcher, called her about the Linton Hall situation. Heidi Williams told Officer P that an employee, Deborah C, had opened an envelope and felt a burning sensation. Deborah C wanted to have the police call her back. Officer P called her back. Officer P recalls that, in their first conversation over the phone, Deborah C said she had opened a letter, felt a burning sensation in her throat, and she had been encouraged to report it. The letter had to do with a research issue. Deborah C said she did not want an emergency medical response. Officer P, pp 461-462, 490.

Heidi Williams, the dispatcher, also called Bruce Wyman, a deputy chief of the East Lansing Fire Department, who was the shift supervisor on October 12th. The East Lansing Fire Department protects the MSU campus and has a fire station on the campus. Bruce Wyman, pp 265-266.

According to a transcript of the dispatch call, the Heidi Williams called Bruce Wyman at 1:54 pm and said,

"A lady opened an envelope. It had a powdery substance in it. Her throat start to burn, and there was a note that said, "Animal research will stop." They are treating it as a hazmat incident. FBI has been notified, and they want you guys over there." Bruce Wyman, p 304.

Wyman told Williams that he would activate the metro team; then he hung up. Bruce Wyman, p 305.

In one of the phone conversations with her supervisor Mary Johnson -- about 30- to 75 minutes after Officer P arrived at Linton Hall -- Officer P recalls this exchange. Johnson happened to mention that there was white powder in the envelope. Officer P asked her, "White powder? What are you talking about?" Johnson did not respond. Officer P said, "There is no white powder, period." Johnson was silent for about five seconds; then Officer P said, "Would you like me to put Debbie C on the phone and she can confirm it for you.?" Johnson said, "Yes. I would like you to do that." Officer P, pp 466-467.

Officer P then put Deborah C on the phone to Johnson. Deborah C told Johnson there was no white powder in the envelope. Officer P, p 467. Deborah C, pp 113-114. Melissa G, p 126.

After Deborah C talked to Johnson, Officer P got back on the phone with Johnson. Johnson said, "I will call you back." Officer P, p 467.

The Women Object

Some time after the "no white powder" phone call, Mary Johnson told Officer P that there would be a decontamination process. Everyone would have to go through the procedure, including Officer P. Officer P, p 468.

At some point, Johnson asked Officer P how many people were in Room 110; Officer P told Johnson there were eight people; she was not specific on their gender. Officer P, p 110.

Officer P told Deborah C, Cathie A, Karen K (the Dean), and the other occupants of Room 110 that they were going to be detained because of biological contamination. Nobody would be allowed to leave the office, and nobody would be allowed to enter. Deborah C, pp 73-74, 77.

Officer P told the people in the office about the "decontamination" procedure. Rescue workers were setting up the decontamination process outside the office in the Linton Hall lobby near the east entrance. Officer P told the occupants of Room 110 that they would have to be decontaminated. Deborah C, pp 77-78, 82. Melissa G, p 127.

Officer P told Cathie A that she was going to be decontaminated. Cathie A said she did not want to be decontaminated. Officer P responded that Cathie A did not have a choice. Cathie A, p 176.

Officer P told Cathie A that the women would be sprayed down with water and perhaps bleach-and-water. They would need to disrobe completely. They had no choice. Cathie A, p 176.

Officer P told Melissa G that she had no choice but to go through the decontamination procedure. Melissa G, p 145.

Amanda M was told by her supervisor and by Officer P that she was going to be decontaminated. Officer P told Amanda M that she did not have a choice. She would be taken to a private room and stripped naked. Amanda M, pp 150-151.

Officer P announced to the women that she herself would need to be decontaminated. Cathie A, p 176.

Believing they had no choice, the women talked and decided the order in which they would be decontaminated. Amanda M, p 157.

An Atmosphere of Panic

Two or three days before 12 October 2001, William Wardwell of the MSU police told Robert Ceru and members of the fire department to get ready for an anthrax (or white powder) attack. Robert Ceru, pp 506-507.

Wardwell gave Bruce Wyman a copy of the Michigan State Police anthrax decontamination guidelines on 11 October 2001. Bruce Wyman, p 297.

Wyman recalls that he was reading a Michigan State Police document on 11 October 2001 and on the morning of 12 October 2001. The document was entitled, "Responding to Incidents Involving Anthrax – Recommended Standard Operating Procedures or Guidelines." Wyman was studying the part that has to do with decontaminating exposed people. Bruce Wyman, pp 296-297.

On Thursday 11 October 2001 and the morning of Friday 12 October 2001, Montgomery was in the East Lansing Fire Department station on the MSU campus. Montgomery was reviewing written decontamination procedures, together with Mark Galat, William Drury, Tim Ledesma, and several others. Michael Montgomery, pp 342-343.

Montgomery recalls that the firemen had been watching TV. They realized the nation was under siege with anthrax contamination. Tom Daschle's office in Washington DC had been contaminated with something in an anthrax-related terrorist event. The firemen were making themselves ready. The campus was a target. There had been other terrorist attacks on the campus. The firemen were getting prepared in case something happened that day. Michael Montgomery, pp 343-344.

Note: For some background on the 2001 anthrax attacks, see:

The firemen had been undergoing terrorism training and pre-terrorism training since 1998. The firemen had a plan for responding to terrorism. Michael Montgomery, p 344.

William Drury was reviewing the wet decontamination procedure on 12 October 2001, just before the call came from Linton Hall. The firemen were discussing what to do if they had that type of call. William Drury, p 385.

Drury recalls that he was the person who had arranged the discussion of the wet decontamination procedure on the morning of 12 October. William Drury, p 386.

Galat and Wyman had discussed the decontamination procedure on 11 October 2001; they agreed its probably going to happen one of these days and that they would probably just use the biological contamination procedures (called "wet decontamination") they already had in place. Mark Galat, p 425.

As Galat and Wyman were discussing the wet decontamination procedure, the call came in from Linton Hall. Mark Galat, p 428.

Fire Fighters Arrive at Linton Hall

At about 2 pm, fire trucks, ambulances, and police cars arrived. Linton Hall was roped off with yellow tape. A crowd gathered. Officer P, p 467. Deborah C, pp 75-76, 116. Cathie A, pp 171-172. Susan P, p 211. Melissa R, pp 194-195, 206. Melissa G, p 133.

When he got the emergency call about Linton Hall, Wyman told Mark Galat to take the fire truck to Linton Hall; he also ordered medic units to the scene. Mark Galat parked his fire truck about 200 or 300 feet south of Linton Hall. Wyman told him to go into the building and find what information he could. Mark Galat, pp 428-429.

Galat met Beard from the MSU police outside the building. Beard told Galat that there was a letter opened with white powder. A woman was complaining about burning eyes and difficulty breathing. Galat reported back to Wyman and told Wyman to bring his car and the fire truck closer to the building. Wyman's car and the truck moved closer and parked in front of the building. Mark Galat, pp 429-431.

The problem at Linton Hall, as Galat understood it, was that a person had opened a letter which contained white powder and had difficulty breathing and a burning sensation in her throat and eyes. Mark Galat, p 428.

When Drury got to Linton Hall, the MSU police were there. William Drury, p 389.

When Montgomery arrived, police were standing outside the hallway keeping people from coming in and out. Michael Montgomery, p 367.

Division of Responsibility

Michael Montgomery, Bruce Wyman, Greg Tracy, Tim Ledesma, Bill Drury, Bob Ceru and Galat met east of the Linton Hall building. Michael Montgomery, p 351.

William Wardwell was in charge of the police. John Palmer was in charge of ORCBS (MSU's Office of Radiation Chemical and Biological Safety). Wyman was in charge of the fire department. Bruce Wyman, p 310.

Wyman did not go into Linton Hall. He stayed in his car until the decontamination procedure was finished. His car was parked about 100 feet from the building. He talked to fire department workers by radio. Bruce Wyman, pp 310, 318.

The fire department was in charge of the decontamination process. Wyman told Mike Montgomery to handle the decontamination. Bruce Wyman, pp 311-313.

Montgomery's job as operations person was to secure the perimeter, making sure that people without official status could not get in or out of the building or the decontamination area. His job was to put people in protective gear and make sure they did not get sick inside their moon suits. Montgomery's job was to follow the decontamination procedure, to check for changes in a patient's health status. His job was to make sure that patients were treated properly. Michael Montgomery, pp 348-349.

Wyman testified that the fire department was responsible for protecting the privacy of the victims inside Linton Hall. Bruce Wyman, pp 311-312.

When asked at the trial who was responsible for privacy, Montgomery testified that he was responsible for their "modesty." Montgomery testified that he had delegated the modesty protection function to others; he, Drury, Newman and Barrett were responsible for modesty. Michael Montgomery, pp 349, 352.

Wyman told Galat to be the safety officer, addressing any safety problems that might affect firefighters. Bruce Wyman, p 313. Mark Galat, p 432.

Wyman told Galat that they were going to treat this as a biological hazard. Wyman told Galat that there was a letter with white powder and a woman with a medical complaint. Mark Galat, p 432.

The problem at Linton Hall, as Galat understood it, was that a person had opened a letter which contained white powder and had difficulty breathing and a burning sensation in her throat and eyes. Mark Galat, p 428.

Galat understood his job to oversee the situation, set up safe zones, warm zones, cold zones. He was in charge of site safety. He was to monitor what needed to be done and make sure it was done. He was responsible for air monitoring. He was responsible for making sure that the command stations inside and outside the building were safe. Mark Galat, pp 432-433.

Wyman told William Drury to be the decontamination officer. He was in charge of the decontamination process. His job was to set up and oversee the decontamination. Bruce Wyman, p 314. William Drury, pp 388-389.

John Parmer, head of ORCBS, told Robert Ceru to take charge of the operation for ORCBS and to help the MSU police and East Lansing fire department. Robert Ceru, pp 502-503.

Drury and Bob Ceru were told that there were seven or eight office workers in Room 110 that were exposed to anthrax. He was told that "we considered this a credible threat." Drury needed to decontaminate those workers and send them to the hospital. They had to be decontaminated before they could be sent to the hospital. William Drury, pp 390-391.

Wyman did not ask if the victims were women, men, students or workers. Bruce Wyman, p 312.

A Decontamination Expert Arrives

Robert Ceru had been working at MSU since about 1991. In 2001, he was the assistant director and chemical safety officer for the MSU office of radiation, chemical and biological safety, called ORCBS. Before he came to MSU, Ceru had run the hazardous material environmental toxicology program for Ingham County (where MSU is located) for 14 years. He has a masters degree "in the science field" from MSU. Robert Ceru, pp 496-497.

Ceru and his office operate largely under Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) laws; he is certified as a hazardous materials technician. He runs the MSU chemical hygiene program, which has responsibilities for chemical safety in MSU's 1,200 laboratories. Robert Ceru, p 497.

Ceru was familiar with the fire department's protocol for biological decontamination. ORCBS had helped write the protocol, and Ceru had participated in fire department training sessions. Robert Ceru, p 498.

On 12 October 2001, at 1:00 or 1:30, John Parmer, the head of ORCBS, called Robert Ceru and said, "We need you to go to Linton Hall. There was a white powder incident in an envelope." Robert Ceru, p 499.

Robert Ceru got to Linton Hall after 1:30 pm. Robert Ceru, p 500.

When Ceru arrived at Linton Hall, John Parmer, some MSU police officials, and someone from the Federal Bureau of Investigation were already there. Robert Ceru, pp 500, 534.

When Ceru arrived at Linton Hall, he asked if he could go into the building. Somebody told him he could not go into the building, that the FBI had declared the place a crime scene; that there was a threat letter; that white powder was involved and was on some of the people. Robert Ceru, p 500.

Robert Ceru talked to Scott Wyman of the East Lansing Fire Department before he went in to Linton hall. Ceru recalls that Wyman was in charge of the fire department crew. Robert Ceru, p 501-502.

In his initial conversation with Robert Ceru, Wyman asked, "Bob, I received this call that there was a threat letter with such-and-such on it from so-and-so and that it contained white powder and we had nine people contaminated." Ceru responded, "Yes, that's right." Bruce Wyman, p 322.

Robert Ceru asked Wyman if he was going to do the wet decontamination process. Wyman said, "Yes." Robert Ceru, p 502.

Forty-five minutes or an hour after he arrived, Robert Ceru went in to Linton Hall. Robert Ceru, p 500.

Drury entered Linton Hall with Bob Ceru to inspect the site. William Drury, p 390.

Robert Ceru went in to Linton Hall for the first time with Mr. Drury of the East Lansing Fire Department; they entered through the front door off Circle Drive. Robert Ceru, p 501.

Montgomery, Drury and Galat from the fire department and Ceru from ORCBS went into the building to inspect and set up. Bruce Wyman, p 317.

Galat changed out of his fireman's gear and entered Linton hall in his uniform -- blue shirt and dark blue pants. Mark Galat, p 435.

When Galat first entered Linton Hall, people were being evacuated from the building past Room 103. He saw about two people leave and heard about others. Mark Galat, pp 442-443.

When Galat entered Linton Hall, he met Bob Ceru and William Drury in the hallway; they were talking about setting up the decontamination process. After talking to Ceru, Drury started setting up. Then Galat went out to the fire truck and helped bring in equipment. Mark Galat, p 436.

Before the decontamination equipment had been set up in the hallway, Robert Ceru and John Parmer came to the door of Room 110, and Officer P had a conversation with them. Officer P recalls that she wanted to get the message across that there was no powder in the letter. Officer P told Ceru that there was indeed no white powder. Ceru told Officer P that the matter was out of his hands; he could not do anything with her information. He was merely helping the fire department, and they were looking for a decontamination site. Officer P recalls that Parmer was standing behind Ceru as they talked in the hallway. Officer P, pp 470-472.

The Fire Chief Arrives -- and Leaves

Randall Talifarro, the East Lansing fire chief, was present at Linton Hall during part of the incident. He arrived after it started and talked to Bruce Wyman. Wyman is sometimes called "Scott." Randall Talifarro, pp 569-570.

Talifarro arrived at Linton Hall between 2:30 and 3:15. Randall Talifarro, p 587.

When Talifarro arrived and talked to Wyman, Wyman said the dispatcher had called him; there was a suspicious letter with a white powder; someone had opened the letter and had a physical reaction. The police had sealed off the building. The people who had been exposed were inside. The FBI had arrived. They had assessed the letter. The author of the letter was a chemist or pharmacist who was on an FBI watchlist. Randall Talifarro, p 570.

Based on what Wyman told him, Talifarro believed there was a threat letter, a credible threat, and people were having reactions. Randall Talifarro, p 572.
During the Linton Hall incident, Wyman stayed in his car. With him were Jim Dunlap, Bill Wardwell and Mary Johnson from the MSU police. Terry Fox from the FBI, John Parmer from ORCBS, Greg Martin from the Lansing Fire Department, Dick Hilbert from the Delta Township Fire Department and perhaps others. Randall Talifarro, p 573.

Talifarro did not talk to the FBI agent; he got his information from Wyman. Randall Talifarro, p 573.

Talifarro described the scene as he arrived:

When I arrived they were actually just beginning to start the decon procedures. I was told that there was a final briefing conducted or that was going to be conducted, in fact that was ongoing at the time, that Bob Ceru was having with those parties on the interior of the building. I was also advised that the police and ORCBS would be the entry team that would go in and do an evaluation and assessment of the letter itself and to retrieve the letter so it could get further analysis by the FBI, and that we would be responsible for the decontamination of the potential victims. Randall Talifarro, p 574.

Talifarro did not assume command of the Linton Hall operation. Randall Talifarro, p 582.

Talifarro was busy with a private medical emergency involving his wife; and when he heard about the situation at Linton Hall, he went to the scene. Randall Talifarro, p 581.

The job of the incident commander or police chief is to provide resources, deal with the press, deal with other agencies. Wyman, for example, never entered the building; that's normal. Randall Talifarro, pp 584, 586.

Talifarro had never been involved in an incident like the Linton Hall incident. Randall Talifarro, p 585.

Talifarro stayed on the scene until the first two women were brought out; then he returned to his own wife at the hospital. Randall Talifarro, p 587.

The Briefing

Greg Tracy, a fire department captain, was in the car with Bruce Wyman; Tracy took notes. According to Greg Tracy's notes, there was a "decon briefing" at 3:06 pm, before the decontamination process started. Bruce Wyman, pp 336-337. Randall Talifarro, p 587.

There was a briefing in rooms 102 and 103. There were six firemen, plus a back up team, plus two people to decontaminate the fire men. They met in the hallway for a briefing. Rooms 102 and 103 were not large enough to accommodate all the decontamination workers, so the crew moved out into the hall to have their briefing meeting. Robert Ceru, p 511.

At the pre-entry briefing that was given by Bob Ceru, there was a discussion about whether the operation was needed. Mark Galat, p 437.

During the briefing, Mary Johnson of the MSU police was talking on her phone and Ceru heard her say, "There's no white powder." Robert Ceru, p 511.

Twelve or fourteen people heard Mary Johnson say, "There's no white powder." Robert Ceru, p 512.

There was a discussion among the rescue workers about the white powder. The two people had been assigned to go into the room. They were the "entry team" -- Peter Grivins of ORCBS and Steve Beard of the MSU police. After Mary Johnson announced that there was no white powder, Grivins and Beard were told to retrieve the letter and verify if there was white powder or not. Robert Ceru, p 512.

There was a discussion during the pre-entry briefing about whether the process should proceed. Mark Galat, p 445.

In the hallway in front of Room 103, Galat overheard other discussions from various people that there was no anthrax or powdery substance. Mark Galat, p 438.

Having heard that there was no anthrax or white powder in the letter, Galat asked Mary Johnson of the MSU police for information. Johnson told him, "We’re starting to get a rumor that there's no powder involved." Galat asked Johnson about the medical condition of the woman who had complained. Johnson told Galat that, "As far as I know, she's doing okay still." Johnson then walked away. Mark Galat, pp 438-439.

Galat started to hear there was no powder involved. He went outside and told Wyman that there was no powder involved. He asked Wyman, "Have you heard any of this? I'm starting to hear information that there is no powder involved." Wyman told Galat, no, he had not heard anything on that subject. Galat went back into the building and the decontamination process was still being set up. At that point things still were not confirmed. Mark Galat, p 438.

Wyman recalls that Galat came out to his car and asked, "Have you heard anything about there not being any white substance?" Wyman replied, "No I have not heard that." Bruce Wyman, p 320.

Ceru had no discussions with Scott Wyman about stopping the decontamination procedure. Ceru does not know if Galat had any discussion with Wyman about stopping the decon procedure. Robert Ceru, p 518.

Wyman recalls that no one suggested to him that the procedure stop. Bruce Wyman, p 322.

Galat did not ask Wyman if the operation should proceed. He told Wyman that there was a rumor that there was no white powder available. Mark Galat, p 445.

When Talifarro arrived and talked to Wyman, Wyman said the dispatcher had called him; there was a suspicious letter with a white powder; someone had opened the letter and had a physical reaction. The police had sealed off the building. The people who had been exposed were inside. The FBI had arrived. They had assessed the letter. The author of the letter was a chemist or pharmacist who was on an FBI watchlist. Randall Talifarro, p 570.

Wyman also told Talifarro that additional people had complained of having reactions to the letter. Randall Talifarro, pp 571-572.

Montgomery had a conversation with Mary Johnson and Bob Ceru about whether to stop the decontamination process. Michael Montgomery, p 370.

Mary Johnson told Michael Montgomery that there was no white powder in the envelope. Michael Montgomery, p 368.

People from ORCBS and the MSU police got the envelope and realized that it did not contain any white powder. Michael Montgomery, pp 367-368.

Montgomery testified:

"We had a brief discussion about whether we should stop the decon line based on the fact of absence of powder, but we also knew that we had patients that had been exposed to something that were having symptoms. So we believed that we knew there wasn't a white powder, but we didn't know what exactly the contaminant was, and so we proceeded with the decon thinking on the patients' benefit that if we didn't decon them, they went home to their families contaminated, they would have contaminated their families. So we proceeded with the decon...." Michael Montgomery, pp 369-370.

Full Speed Ahead

Deborah C asked the Dean, Karen K, to stop the decontamination procedure.
Karen K had a discussion with Robert Ceru outside Room 110 near the bathroom. As Ceru was walking down the hallway, Karen K called to him and asked whether they really needed to go through the decontamination procedure. Ceru told her, "We don't have a choice. This is the East Lansing Fire Department's standard protocol." Deborah C, p 83. Robert Ceru, pp 518-519.

Mary Johnson told Officer P that there was going to be a decontamination process because there might be a substance on the letter that could have possibly contaminated the people in Room 110. Officer P, p 466.

Before the decontamination equipment had been set up in the hallway, Robert Ceru and John Parmer came to the door of Room 110, and Officer P had a conversation with them. Officer P told Ceru that there was indeed no white powder. Ceru told Officer P that the matter was out of his hands; he could not do anything with Officer P's information; he was merely helping the fire department, and they were looking for a decontamination site. Parmer was standing behind Ceru as he talked to Officer P in the hallway. Officer P, pp 470-472.

Galat and others asked Ceru several times, "Should we continue?" Ceru told them:

It was not my purview to change the decon procedure for a white powder incident. My job there was to make sure that people wore the proper chemical protective clothing, they wore the proper respiratory protection program, and they proceeded to obtain the package, that we supported the MSU police. As far as a decon procedure for patients particularly experiencing symptoms is beyond my scope of my job and my knowledge base. Robert Ceru, pp 516-517.

Ceru does not recall the exact response he made to Galat when Galat asked, "Should we continue." Robert Ceru, p 517.

When Galat asked Ceru, Should we continue, Ceru responded:

"It's not within my authority. It's within the incident command structure to make that decision... That's something ... to discuss with incident command... Scott Wyman." Robert Ceru, pp 517-518.

John Parmer also asked Ceru whether the procedure should be stopped. Ceru gave Parmer the same negative response he gave Galat: Ceru did not have authority to stop the process; only Wyman could stop it. Robert Ceru, p 518.

Ceru thought continuing with the decontamination rather than stopping it was the best thing to do, based on what he knew at the time. Robert Ceru, p 537.

Galat said to Ceru, "If it is confirmed that there is no white powder, do we need to continue with this decon." Ceru replied, "Absolutely." Mark Galat, p 445.

Galat testified:

It was decided – East Lansing Fire Department made the decision that it was going to be treated as a biological decon, a biological hazard, based on the information that was given to the deputy chief of the fire department. Bob – there was a unified command. I deal with Bob on a daily basis and have a great deal of respect for him and his opinions, so we were talking back and forth. I asked him questions. Does this need to be done? His boss, John Parmer, was next to me and when I asked the question, he also nodded his head and said, Yeah. Do we still need to do this? And again, Bob Ceru's answer was, Absolutely, even if there's no powder....

We had no confirmation a hundred percent. We're worried about the patients' well-being. Everything we did that day was because we were worried about the threat of the powder being anthrax with the lady having opened it and experiencing, like I said, a burning sensation. We were very concerned about that. It was discussed, well, just because there's no powder doesn't mean it doesn't need to continue. Yes, it does. We don't know what it is, if there's something there. It's a credible threat. The FBI is here. They know the person who sent the letter.... Mark Galat, p 446.

Men in Protective Gear Check the Letter

Officer P announced to the women in Room 110 that people in chemical protective gear would come to Room 110 to examine the letter. The two people in moon suits came in to Room 110 about 30- or 45 minutes, or longer, after Deborah C called the MSU police. They were completely covered, with glass visors to see through, and oxygen tanks inside their suits. They went over to the letter. Deborah C, pp 79-80. Cathie A, p 175.

Steven Beard was one of the men; a detective with the campus police. Steven Beard, pp 546-547.

Beard testified that Officer P told him that the letter had been opened in Room 116 resealed and opened again in Room 110. Steven Beard, p 551.

Officer P testified that she told Beard that the letter had not been opened in Room 110 but had been re-sealed before it was brought to Room 110. Officer P, p 477.

Nonetheless, Beard opened the letter. He read the contents of the letter over his radio. Officer P, pp 476-477.

Officer P did not look at the letter while Beard was reading it and does not remember exactly what Beard reported that letter said. Officer P, p 479.

Beard reported by radio to Mary Johnson that there was no powder on the letter. Johnson replied, instructing him to put the letter in a package. Steven Beard, pp 551-552.

Ceru recalls that, before the decontamination process started, Beard and Grivins went in to the room, looked at the envelope and reported over the radio that there was no white powder associated with the envelope. Robert Ceru, pp 513-515.

Ceru recalls that Galat was in the room when they heard Beard and Grivins report over the radio that there was no white powder associated with the envelope. Robert Ceru, pp 516.

Beard took a photo of the letter through the plastic bag. It was addressed to the vice president of graduate studies and research. It says, "Stop animal exploitation now." Steven Beard, pp 552-553.

Grivins and Beard brought the letter out of Room 110 and gave it to the FBI. The FBI sent the envelope to a laboratory for testing. The test results showed nothing. Bruce Wyman, p 326. Robert Ceru, p 535.

Rescuers Decontaminate -- or Molest -- Fifteen Women

The men in hazmat suits turned on their 60-minute air tanks at 4:03 pm. The decontamination process started at 4:15. The decontamination procedure was complete at 5:06 pm. Bruce Wyman, p 338. Deborah C, pp 82-83. Robert Ceru, p 522.

The decontamination process did not start until Beard and Grivins had gone into Room 110, looked at the envelope, and reported over the radio to Mary Johnson that it did not contain any powder. Robert Ceru, p 513. Steven Beard, p 552.

Fifteen women were decontaminated. Testifying at the trial were Deborah C, Melissa G, Amanda M, Cathie A, Officer P, Melissa R, Susan P, and Evette C. Those witnesses reported some information about other women. As near as can be determined from the testimony, the women were decontaminated in the following order:

Deborah C 1
Melissa G 2
Hope J 3
Amanda M 4
Cathie A 5
Karen K ...
Officer P 9
Melissa R 10 ...
Yvonne S 12
Susan P 13
Danielle W 14
Evette C 15

Deborah C -- Number 1

Deborah C was the first person to be decontaminated. She was decontaminated at 4:15 pm. Deborah C, p 83.

Two hazmat men greeted Deborah C at the door of Room 110 as she entered the hallway. Deborah C, pp 83-84.

The two hazmat men led Deborah C to "pool 1", then "pool 2", then "pool 3." The pools were not actually numbered. The pools looked like the pools that little kids play in. Deborah C, p 84.

At pool 1, somebody sprayed Deborah C with cold water. Deborah C, p 84.

The firemen used a hand pressurized sprayer to spray the women. William Drury, p 392.

At pool 1, Deborah C had her clothes on when she was sprayed with cold water. She was wearing a blue jean dress, a navy blue top, and blue high heels. Deborah C, p 84.

The water was cold; Deborah C did not see where the water came from. Deborah C, p 85.

After pool 1, somebody told Deborah C to walk to pool 2, which included a large clear plastic bag. Deborah C, p 85.

Two moon-suited hazmat officials were in the pool area, one on Deborah C's left and on her right. Deborah C did not notice anyone else in moon suits while she was being decontaminated. Deborah C, p 85.

While she was being decontaminated, there were 3 or 5 other men lined up against the north wall in the hallway outside suite 100, just north of the pool area, 8 or 10 feet away from Deborah C. There was another man standing near the door of room 106. None of the other men wore moon suits; they were in plain clothes. Deborah C, p 87.

The area where the wash-down took place is on a lower level hallway, about 5 steps down from room 118. Deborah C, p 105.

The men in the hallway were on the same level where the decontamination process took place. Deborah C, p 109.

Pool 2 was in another hallway west of the lobby and behind some closed glass doors. Deborah C, p 88.

Somebody told Deborah C to step into the plastic bag at pool 2 and take her clothes off. The bag was large enough for one person. Two men held the bag up while Deborah C stood inside. The bag went up to Deborah C's chest. The bag was clear – one could see through it. Deborah C, pp 88-89.

Deborah C took off her clothes while standing in the plastic bag in pool 2. She dropped her clothes at her feet. Deborah C, p 89.

Somebody sprayed Deborah C with cold water and bleach while she stood in the plastic bag in pool 2. It was bleach; it smelled like bleach. Deborah C, p 89.

Deborah C cried as she stood in pool 2. She also hyperventilated. No one offered to help Deborah C stop hyperventilating. She held a towel over her face and breathed through it; that helped. Deborah C, pp 89, 91.

The bleach and water, coming from a source over her head, got in Deborah C's eyes. Someone handed Deborah C a towel to put over her eyes. Deborah C, p 90.

Somebody rubbed Deborah C's body with a wash rag. The men washed Deborah C's breasts and private parts. Deborah C, pp 90-91.

The two men talked while they rubbed Deborah C's body. The men were in conflict as they washed Deborah C's body; the man on the left said, two or three times, "Don't wash her there." "Don’t touch her there." Deborah C, pp 90-91.

There were no women involved in the decontamination process. Deborah C, p 91.

Somebody led Deborah C to pool 3. She was naked in pool 3. Her clothes were in the plastic bag in pool 2. In pool 3 she was rinsed. Deborah C, p 92.

After rinsing Deborah C in pool 2, one of the men handed her a towel. She wiped herself dry. The other men in the hallway could watch. Deborah C, p 92.

After she dried herself, one of the hazmat men gave Deborah C a gray jumpsuit, with a zipper, similar to what an auto mechanic might wear. Deborah C does not know if the jump suit was made of cloth or paper. Deborah C, pp 92-93.

The hazmat man offered to help Deborah C get into the jump suit. She refused and got into the jumpsuit herself. Deborah C, p 93.

After she put on the jumpsuit, men escorted Deborah C down the hallway. There were people "lurking out of the offices." They were in plain clothes. Deborah C, pp 93-94.

Robert Ceru denies that he was in the hall where the women were being decontaminated. He testified that, after he entered the building the first time, he never again entered the hallway where the decontamination was performed. Robert Ceru, p 530.

Ceru stayed in Room 102 or Room 103 and in the north part of the hallway near the loading dock were the ambulances parked. Robert Ceru, pp 522-523.

Ceru did not know where Galat and Drury were during the decontamination process. Robert Ceru, p 523.

With Ceru in the 102-103 area were ORCBS people and some Lansing and East Lansing firemen -- 12 to 15 people. Most were in plain clothes. People were coming into the building with equipment and supplies. They entered and left the building through the back door. Robert Ceru, pp 524-525, 529-530.

Ceru did not see any of the women being decontaminated. He did not see any of the 12 – 15 people go into the hallway where the women were being decontaminated. Robert Ceru, p 525.

At trial, Mr. Ceru offered the comment that, in decontamination, it is routine to take off people's clothes because clothes can trap toxic material on the skin. Robert Ceru, pp 536-537.

Mr. Ceru also conceded that, in most MSU laboratories, there are showers, either in the hallways or in restrooms, where laboratory workers who spill chemicals on themselves can wash. They are advised to take their clothes off if chemicals are spilled on their clothes. In most cases, washing is done before anyone from ORCBS arrives on the scene. Ceru has never himself washed a person in a laboratory after a spill. Robert Ceru, pp 539-541.

Melissa G -- Number 2

Melissa G was decontaminated right after Deborah C, who was first. Melissa G, p 127.

Melissa G was sitting in the office; the hazmat men pointed to her and told her she would be going first. She said, no, Deborah C was supposed to go first. The hazmat men then took Deborah C. Melissa G, p 128.

When Melissa G started the process, she saw Deborah C in pool 2. Melissa G, p 131.

After Melissa G began the process she stopped paying attention to what was happening to Deborah C. Melissa G, p 131.

Melissa G stepped out into the hallway. No one had explained the procedure to her. A man held her. She had her clothes on. She was sprayed with something. No one told her what it was. She was standing in "pool 1" or "station 1." Melissa G, p 128.

After the first station, the man placed Melissa G in the second station. He told her to undress as quickly as possible. He told her to step into a bag. She took her clothes off. They had a brush, like a toilet bowl brush. There were two men. One man sprayed Melissa G with something; it tasted like bleach. The other man, on her left, scraped her with the brush. Melissa G, p 129.

The bag was of clear plastic. The two men held it at about chest level. Melissa G, p 129.

Melissa G had no mask on her face while the men sprayed her with bleach. No one offered her a mask. Someone handed her a towel. She covered her face with the towel. Melissa G, pp 129-130.

The men in hazmat suits talked to Melissa G and to each other. Their voices were muffled. She is not sure what they said. Melissa G, p 130.

No one told Melissa G that they were spraying her with bleach. Melissa G assumed it was bleach she was being sprayed with because she could smell it. Melissa G, p 130.

There were two pools, not three. After she stepped out of pool 2, she was made to stand on a mat. Melissa G, p 130.

There were four people in hazmat suits. Melissa G, p 131.

There was a man in plain clothes standing beyond the four men in hazmat suits during the decontamination. He stood in the middle of the hallway, directing. Melissa G, p 131.

There were three or four people in the hallway while Melissa G was walking to the ambulance. Melissa G, p 132.

Melissa G did not look around her while she was undergoing the decontamination process. Melissa G, p 132.

Four people were in hazmat suits. Three or four others were in plain clothes. Melissa G, p 144.

Drury recalls that he was in charge of the decontamination process and the people who were performing the decontamination. Drury positioned himself in a corridor, and he stayed there during the entire process, for at least an hour. He was in a fire department uniform, a blue shirt and dark blue pants. William Drury, pp 399-401.

After they sprayed her with bleach and scraped her with a brush, the men told Melissa G to step out of the bag and walk to a fourth man in a hazmat outfit who produced a gray jump suit. He told Melissa G to step into the jump suit. He held the jump suit while she put it on and zipped it. Melissa G, p 129.

Hope J -- Number 3 and
Amanda M -- Number 4

Amanda M was the fourth person to be decontaminated. Amanda M, p 152.

After the third person went out, the first man at station one in the hazmat suit opened the door to room 110 and waved to Amanda M. She went out. Amanda M, p 152.

Amanda M noticed that the third person to be decontaminated was Hope J,
a student employee at Linton Hall. Amanda M, p 152.

At the first station, Amanda M was sprayed down with a light mist on top of her clothing. Amanda M, p 152.

After being sprayed at the first station, Amanda M watched Hope J get washed at station two. Johnson got out of the bag and went to the mat which was station three. Then she put on her jump suit and walked out. Amanda M, p 152.

Amanda M saw Hope J walk out in her jump suit; then Amanda M was allowed to move to station two. She was told to remove her clothes while standing in the clear plastic bag. She held the bag with one hand and took off her clothes with the other. Amanda M, p 153.

At station 2, Amanda M was sprayed down by the man on the right. She was sprayed with bleach. She could smell and taste the bleach. The bleach burned her eyes. She was sprayed on her face and hair, then down the rest of her body. The man on the left scrubbed her with a toilet brush. Amanda M, pp 153, 162.

The man scrubbed Amanda M with a toilet brush on her breasts, lower stomach, private parts, and the backs of her thighs. Amanda M, p 153.

The men did not say anything while they scrubbed Amanda M. Amanda M, p 154.

After the men stopped spraying her at station two, they told Amanda M to take her hands off her face and go to station three, which was a mat. Amanda M, p 154.

At the mat, station three, Amanda M stood for about a minute. Then someone gave her a hand towel and told her to dry off. Amanda M, p 154.

Two minutes after she dried herself, someone handed Amanda M a jump suit. Amanda M, p 154.

No one asked Amanda M any questions during the decontamination process. Amanda M, p 154.

A man in a blue shirt from the City of East Lansing was standing near station three behind one of the men in a moon suit. The man in the blue shirt said, "Stop scrubbing them. We’re going to run out of air. Just hose the rest of them down." Amanda M, pp 154-155.

There were men in blue shirts in the room, watching Amanda M be scrubbed down. They were moving around, sometimes talking to each other, sometimes watching. They came in and out of the hallway. The number of men in the hallway varied from four to seven from time to time. Amanda M, p 156.

They came in and out of the hallway. The number of men in the hallway varied from four to seven from time to time. Amanda M, p 156.

When she was finished putting on her jump suit, a man in a blue shirt pointed down the hallway in the direction that Hope J had gone, indicating that Amanda M should go that way, too. Amanda M walked down the hallway and out the back door; she saw the ambulance. Amanda M, pp 156-157.

Amanda M saw the moon suited men using a toilet brush on Hope J. Behind Amanda M was Cathie A. Amanda M, p 157.

There were two young men (probably students who worked upstairs) who stood in a stairway and watched as Amanda M was scrubbed. Amanda M, pp 158-159, 165.

Amanda M pulled the bag up to waist height as she took off her clothes. She could not hold it any higher; it kept slipping out of her hand. Amanda M, p 160.

While she was at station two, four to six men in plain clothes, wearing blue shirts, were in the hallway with her, watching. Amanda M, p 161.

Cathie A -- Number 5

Cathie A was number five to be decontaminated. Amanda M was ahead of her. Cathie A, p 177.

A man in a hazmat suit came to the door and said, "Next." It was Cathie A's turn; she went out. Cathie A went to the first station. She turned her back to Amanda M "to give her privacy." Cathie A, p 177.

The pools were in a straight line in the hallway. Cathie A, p 178.

At station B, Cathie A was asked to remove her clothes. Two men held the bag for her. Cathie A, p 178.

The windows at the front entrance to Linton Hall were covered in plastic; Cathie A could not see out the front door. Cathie A, p 179.

Cathie A stepped into the bag at station 2. She removed her shoes and clothes. Cathie A, p 179.

Cathie A stood on top of her clothes in the bag in station 2. Cathie A, p 179.

The men at station two sprayed Cathie A with bleach and water. Cathie A, p 179.

Somebody gave Cathie A a towel to cover her face. Cathie A, p 180.

Cathie A found it hard to breathe because a bleach-soaked towel covered her face. Cathie A, p 180.

After Cathie A was finished at station two and got out of the bag, the men tied up the bag and threw it on a pile of other bags filled with clothes. Cathie A, p 180.

After station 2, Cathie A went to stand on a mat. Another man in a hazmat suit handed her a jump suit and told her to put it on. The man offered to zip it up; Cathie A refused and zipped it up herself. Cathie A, p 181.

There were people in the hallway during the decontamination procedure. Cathie A, p 187.

There were 15 people in plain clothes in the hallway. Cathie A, p 181.

Someone led Cathie A down the hallway after she put on the jump suit. She waited in the hall for five minutes until an ambulance arrived. Cathie A, p 183-184.

Officer P -- Number 9

While she was waiting in Room 110, Officer P glanced at the decontamination process from time to time. She saw plain clothed men in the decontamination area. Officer P, pp 475, 480.

On the other side of a door, to the north of the decontamination area, were many men. Some were wearing street clothes, not uniforms. Officer P, pp 485, 492.

Once the decontamination process started, a woman went through the line every few minutes. Officer P, p 479.

Officer P knew all the firemen who were performing the decontamination. She saw Drury in the area, directing operations. Montgomery was observing. Officer P, pp 474-476, 484-485.

Officer P was the last woman from Room 110 to go through the decontamination procedure, the ninth woman. Officer P, pp 473, 480.

Officer P went through the decontamination process. At the first step, she stood on a pile of clothes, and they sprayed water over her clothes. There was no bag; just a pile of clothes. Somebody told her to take her clothes off, she took her clothes off and then stepped into another area where they sprayed her body with a mixture of beach and water. No one used a brush on Officer P. Then Officer P went to a third place where she was sprayed with water. Then somebody gave Officer P a towel and a paper jumpsuit. Officer P, pp 481-482, 483.

The Second Group of Women

Montgomery discussed stopping the decontamination procedure after the first nine people had been decontaminated and they discovered there was no white powder. Michael Montgomery, p 367.

Montgomery testified:

[After the first nine women were decontaminated] we had not confirmed what the particulate or what the item was. So we really truly didn't know whether we were going to contaminate their families or not and/or their co-workers...." Michael Montgomery, pp 369-370.

After some women had been decontaminated, Drury learned that there were more people involved who needed decontamination. Drury does not know where in the building the additional women came from who were decontaminated. William Drury, p 398.

As far as Drury was concerned, this was a credible threat, and the firemen needed to take it seriously until proven otherwise. But nobody proved otherwise to Drury, and it was not Drury's job to confirm whether there was anthrax or powder on the scene. Drury did not think about whether there was really anthrax. He just did his job. William Drury, pp 404-405.

There was no training that addressed the issue of stopping the decontamination procedure. Bruce Wyman, p 322.

Melissa R -- Number 10

Melissa R was the 10th person to be decontaminated. Melissa R, p 197.

Melissa R was decontaminated before the people in Room 116. Melissa R, p 197.

A man in a hazmat suit came into the room and pulled or escorted Melissa R out. Melissa R, p 197.

As she was being taken out, Melissa R saw a man sitting on the stairs outside Room 118. Melissa R, p 197.

Melissa R walked down the hallway. The man in the protective suit walked behind her. Melissa R, p 198.

As she walked down the hallway, Melissa R saw men standing around. Melissa R, p 199.

Some of the people standing around were in chemical suits and others were not. Melissa R, p 199.

Melissa R saw Karen K being decontaminated. Melissa R, p 200.

Before she was taken to be decontaminated, Melissa R was standing outside Room 116 when she saw Karen K being decontaminated. Melissa R, p 200.

When she went through the decontamination, Melissa R saw no one else in line. Melissa R, p 200.

When Melissa R was decontaminated, there was one pool. She was told to step into a bag and to take off her clothes. Melissa R, p 201.

Two men held the bag chest-high. Melissa R, p 202.

There were other people's clothes in the bag. Melissa R stood on their clothes and shoes. Melissa R, p 202.

Melissa R was washed with a solution containing bleach. Melissa R, p 202.

After she got out of the bag, Melissa R was sent over to a man who handed her a wet towel – a used towel. She dried her face. Melissa R, p 202.

Men were standing around the pool. Some had plain clothes. Some had chemical suits. Melissa R, p 202.

The man who handed her the wet towel and paper suit was wearing plain clothes. Melissa R, p 202.

The man who handed Melissa R the wet used towel also handed her a paper garment to wear. Melissa R, p 202.

After the treatment, someone led Melissa R down the hallway. A man in plain clothes asked her for her last name. Melissa R, p 203.

Melissa R wore no shoes or socks as she walked outside. Melissa R, p 203.

Melissa R's student was behind her in the decontamination order. Melissa R, p 205.

Someone was sitting on a stairway, watching the process. Melissa R, pp 207-208.

The only thing anyone said to Melissa R during the process was "put the suit on." And at the end someone asked for her name. Melissa R, pp 208-209.

Susan P -- Number 13

Susan P was number 13 in the decontamination order. After Susan P, Danielle W was next in the decontamination order. After Danielle W was Evette C. Susan P, p 217.

Susan P objected to the decontamination. She objected to the decontamination to Dean Karen K. She objected to the decontamination to the two men in protective suits who entered Room 116. She asked them why "we" were being decontaminated, and they told her they did not know why. Susan P said "we" wanted to have women do the decontamination process, and they told her there were not any women available and that it was a highly technical process. Susan P, p 216.

The two men in hazmat suits came to Room 116 for Susan P were in a hurry; they were concerned about running out of air. Susan P, pp 217, 223.

Susan P went through the decontamination procedure at about 5 pm. Susan P, p 217.

A man in a decontamination suit escorted Susan P down the hallway. She told him she did not want to do it. But she agreed to go down the hall. He took her by the arm and escorted her down the hall. She said, "Don't touch me." She grabbed her arm away from him. Susan P, pp 217-218, 220.

As she was being taken down the hallway to start the decontamination process, Susan P saw Yvonne S being decontaminated. Yvonne S was standing there naked. Susan P, p 219.

As she was being taken down the hallway to start the decontamination process, Susan P saw a man sitting on the steps next to the banister about five or six steps up. He was looking to the west. She now knows the man was Michael Hawksey, a computer technician for the College of Arts and Letters. Susan P, pp 219-220.

As she was being led to the decontamination pool, Susan P went through a set of doors with glass windows. The doors were closed but the glass was not covered. Susan P, p 220.

Susan P testified

Well when I entered, I stood there and I noticed that there were two men in decon suits and just a few feet away from them there were men in street clothing, and I said, This has to be a joke, and the person in charge of the decontamination in that area said to call my lawyer. Susan P, p 221.

In the decontamination area, Susan P referred to the process as a joke. She was not speaking to anyone in particular. When she first entered the room, she paused, looked around at the set-up, and saw that there were men in regular clothes only a few feet away from the men in decontamination suits. She said, "This has to be a joke." In response, a man in a fire department uniform said, "Call your lawyer." The man did not say anything else to Susan P after that. Susan P, pp 230-231.

The man who told Susan P to call her lawyer was wearing a fire department uniform; he was not in a protective suit. Susan P, p 221.

At the trial, Mr. Drury protested that he would never say anything like, "Call your lawyer." William Drury, p 402.

Mark Galat recalls that one of the women said, "This is a joke." Mark Galat, p 453.

Galat did not hear anyone respond to the woman who said, "This is a joke." Mark Galat, p 453.

After the fire department official told her to call her lawyer, Susan P did not make any more comments. Susan P, p 221.

As the decontamination process started, the men asked Susan P to step into a bag, stand on a pile of clothes and shoes and take off her clothes. The pile of clothing was the accumulated clothing of about four women. In the process she lost her balance – her balance is impaired from her medical condition -- and she reached out to a man who held her to keep her from falling. Susan P, pp 221-222.

Susan P was not sprayed with anything before she took off her clothes. Susan P, p 222.

Susan P was not made to stand in a pool as she took off her clothes. Susan P, p 222.

Susan P was not standing inside a bag as she took off her clothes. Susan P,